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Abstract 
Recent research on interorganizational trust has stressed the need to develop a deeper 
understanding of the multi-level nature of this construct. This article focuses on trust on 
different analytical levels in an interorganizational context, and on the hitherto underspecified 
connections between these. Based on an institutionalization approach, it revisits the classic 
question: (how) can organizations trust each other? To do so, we consider organizations as 
objects of trust and reappraise the transferral from interpersonal to interorganizational trust in 
"facework" (Giddens, 1990). We also examine the conflicts and struggles of trust and power 
that can arise from this process between boundary spanners and their organizational 
constituents. Next, we consider organizations as subjects of trust in interorganizational 
relationships. We detail the institutionalization of trust and its reproduction on an 
organizational level, and how it can be transmitted to new generations of organizational 
actors, creating path-dependent histories of trust which are truly interorganizational. Taking 
up the theme of trust and power, we analyze ways in which the institutionalization of trust can 
entail that of power, too, and examine the implications of this from a critical point of view. 
We conclude that in interorganizational trust, both the subject and object of trust move across 
analytical levels, and further, that this movement demonstrates the significance of the 
organization as a distinct entity that can be both trusted and trusting. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, the centrality of trust in economic relationships has come to be 
increasingly acknowledged – a development that, if anything, seems likely to become even 
more pronounced now that the emergence of the present crisis has been so obviously linked to 
an escalation and collapse of trust. Correspondingly, trust literature has burgeoned. Inter-
organizational trust has remained a particularly compelling subject partly because it allows us 
to study processes of trust building in the absence of the integrating normative horizon that 
comes with common organizational membership, so that it is largely up to trustor and trustee 
to define their context and engage in active trust constitution (Giddens 1994; Möllering, 
2006a). More importantly to the highly prolific research on long-term interfirm cooperation 
such as joint ventures, the effects of trust on economic performance are still far from clear 
(Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). Accordingly, trust has become one of the most frequently cited 
concepts in studies of cooperative interorganizational relationships (Grandori & Soda, 1995; 
Rao & Schmidt, 1998; Arnott, 2007; Zaheer & Harris, 2006). Yet it is only relatively recently 
that interorganizational trust has come to be acknowledged as a distinct construct, with 
previous research focusing on trust in isolated dyads without due consideration of its 
organizational context (Currall & Inkpen, 2002; Ferrin et al., 2006; but see e.g. Lane & 
Bachmann, 1996; Arrighetti et al., 1997). Despite Rousseau's (1985) emphatic demand to 
study both the individual and organizational levels simultaneously, multi-level research in this 
area is nascent at best. The connections between trust on the interpersonal and 
interorganizational levels have remained underspecified; recent studies bemoan particularly 
our lack of insight in how trust is built between and across these analytical levels (Gulati & 
Sytch, 2008; Fang et al., 2008). Zaheer and colleagues (1998), too, note the fundamental 
challenge to transpose an individual-level concept like trust to the organizational level. 
 The present contribution aims to help fill this crucial gap. If we acknowledge that 
organizations as entities may play a significant role in trust building, but that it is still 
individual actors who engage in trust building activities (Six & Sorge, 2006; Gulati & Sytch, 
2008), we need to ask: What are the mechanisms and processes that link and mediate between 
trust on the (inter)personal and the (inter)organizational levels? 
 We contend that this question is of singular importance if we aim to understand the 
phenomenon of interorganizational trust more fully, and further, that an institutionalization 
approach is best suited to addressing this complex issue. In the following, we will thus ask the 
classic question "(how) can organizations trust each other?" anew from an institutionalization 
perspective. In doing so, we will see that (a) the organization, as a distinct entity, does indeed 
have a decisive role to play in interorganizational trust building, and (b) that there is a 
continuous movement of trust between analytical levels which is constitutive of all 
interorganizational trust. As this applies to both the "object" and "subject" sides of an 
interorganizational trust relationship, we will take a fresh look at both of these in consecutive 
sections. Before doing so, however, the institutionalization perspective employed requires 
some further elucidation. 
 
The institutionalization approach 
 
Much theorizing on trust has, implicitly or explicitly, displayed a bias towards either overly 
individual or overly structural accounts (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). The former are prone to 
treat trust as a strictly individual phenomenon (Kramer, 1996), often even as the result chiefly 
of relatively stable individual predispositions (in the tradition of Rotter, 1971), but are thus 
unable to adequately account for the intersubjective, cultural components that trusting conduct 
clearly displays. The latter, by contrast, often focus merely on favourable preconditions for 
trust (e.g., higher in-group homogeneity; Zucker, 1986) and tend to equate these to 
corresponding trust levels in a quasi-automatic, but therefore mechanistic fashion that 
neglects the decisive impact of individual agency on trust building in a given relationship. 
 We see an institutionalization perspective as the most promising approach to combine all 
of these concerns, and to account for the influences both of structure and agency, of 
institutional preconditions and creative interaction. In the following, we will adopt Berger & 
Luckmann's (1967) social constructionist account of institutionalization. We are aware of the 
merits of alternative approaches such as structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) (indeed, so 
much so that we include elements of it into our framework; see below). We have chosen 
Berger & Luckmann's theory particularly because it elucidates best the interplay of individual 
and intersubjective facets in institutionalizing trust, but also because of its excellent 
metatheoretical fit with the neoinstitutionalist theory we use (Scott, 2008). 
 This approach allows us to transcend orthodox approaches by considering not only the 
institutional bases or antecedents of trust (see again Zucker, 1986), but further conceiving of 
trust itself as capable of institutionalization. Trust can be institutionalized in the form of roles 
and routines for trusting, which need to be creatively enacted. Thus, institutionalized trust 
emerges as a construct that consists of intersubjective rules for trusting and being (or 
appearing) trustworthy, but strictly speaking only exists in interaction. We can conceive of 
these ongoing processes as a cycle of institutionalization in which interaction contributes to 
(but does not fully determine) the (re-)production of structural forms of trust, and these 
structures in turn contribute to (but do not fully determine) the (re-)production of trusting 
interaction. In this, the freedom of actors within institutional boundaries which are at the same 
time constraining and enabling allows for highly variable degrees of identity/non-identity of 
reproduction (cf. fig. 1). This accounts for the finding that trust clearly possesses 
intersubjective elements, but at the same time always constitutes an "idiosyncratic 
accomplishment" (Möllering, 2006a). 
We are concerned primarily with the meso level, as a distinctively organizational subject 
(rather than the overarching societal macro level; Rousseau & House, 1994), and its interplay 
with micro level processes. This allows us to study institutionalization as a substantive 
process, and the ways in which actors, drawing on their individual agency, construct and 
reconstruct organizational realities of trust and react to them in reflexive and often strategic 
ways (Giddens, 1984).1 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 The following investigation of organizations as objects and sources of trusting behavior 
will be based on this institutionalization model. First, we will address organizations, and thus 
the roles and routines institutionalized within them,2 as objects of trust. This is both the more 
conventional (as more frequently addressed) and the broader question. The range of roles and 
routines that may be considered trust-relevant by an outside observer is much wider than that 
of the specific roles and routines that make up institutionalized trust proper. We will thus turn 
to the object angle first, coming to the question of organizations as subjects of trust only after 
that, at which point we will also specify our understanding of institutionalization in greater 
detail. 
 
"Trusting organizations": Organizations as objects of trust 
 
Part of interorganizational trust is that an external observer places their trust in an 
organization as the trusted object. In the following, we will refer to this aspect as 
organizational trust. We will thus be concerned with trust that refers to institutionalized roles 
and routines within organizations, as well as the connections between the two different object 
levels (i.e., between trust in organizational representatives as individuals and trust relating to 
their organizations). This is a topic regularly touched upon in treatments of 
interorganizational trust, but the mechanisms and processes involved have hardly been 
specified further since Giddens' description of trust in expert systems (1990, 1994; also see 
below), itself a development of Luhmann's seminal ideas about system trust (1979). At the 
same time, trust on the organizational level is frequently defined by simple analogies to 
interpersonal trust (Bigley & Pearce, 1998). Consequently, we will begin by locating 
organizational trust in reference to these two poles. 
 
Organizational trust between interpersonal and system trust 
It is certainly correct that the structure and logic of interpersonal and organizational trust are 
"essentially similar" (Govier, 1994). In both, the trustor makes a decision based on "good 
reasons" to make themselves vulnerable, thus making a risky investment but reducing 
complexity by bracketing out the possibility of unfavorable future actions by the trustee 
(Luhmann, 1979; Bachmann, 2001; Möllering, 2006b). 
While these commonalities are widely recognized, the increasing acknowledgement of 
interpersonal and interorganizational trust as distinct constructs is typically based only on the 
empirical observation that one can exist in the other's absence (Doney & Cannon, 1997; 
Jeffries & Reed, 2000; also see, however, Hagen & Simons, 2003). The most obvious 
difference is that organizational trust is placed in a social system. Rather than referring to the 
competence and/or goodwill of an individual actor, this type of trust refers to an 
organization's perceived aims and values, and the adequacy of the roles and routines 
institutionalized for their implementation (Lepsius, 1997). As such, it is clearly a form of 
system trust (Luhmann, 1979; Giddens, 1990). 
However, counter to a common interpretation (e.g. Lahno, 2001), organizational trust is 
not purely system trust. System trust is characteristically diffuse. It does not encourage an 
active search for alternatives; its degree of taken-for-grantedness is high. Organizations, by 
contrast, do not appear as "given", but are identifiable as discrete entities; divergent 
attributions of reliability and trustworthiness often constitute a pivotal factor in making 
choices between individual organizations (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Organizational trust thus 
lacks the tacit, "automatic" qualities of system trust stressed by Luhmann; its creation 
involves much higher degrees of reflexivity. Morgner (2008) probes deeper into this 
important distinction, arguing that organizations, but not the overarching social systems that 
Luhmann's concept refers to, are "addressable" (i.e., attributions have a concrete social 
referent). As a consequence organizational, but not system trust is "conditionable" (i.e., the 
actor can base their trust decision fundamentally on testing trustworthiness in sequential 
interactions), pointing towards fundamental differences in their creation. Organizational trust 
is thus indeed a distinctly meso level form of trust. In important respects, it is situated between 
interpersonal and system trust. 
Regarding interdependencies between the (inter)personal and (inter)organizational levels, 
it is widely accepted that trust between organizational representatives is at least partly based 
on organizational trust, as the latter "provides a context for interpersonal trust and the 
relationship between negotiators" (Jeffries & Reed, 2000: 874; for an empirical confirmation 
see Doney & Cannon, 1997). From an institutionalization perspective, it becomes evident that 
existing organizational trust can act as an antecedent facilitating the building of interpersonal 
trust in interaction, in a fashion similar to but more powerful than the effects of a known 
organizational reputation (Lorenz, 1988). It achieves a pre-reduction of social complexity 
which reduces the risk of trusting. In this way, it can serve as a "stepping stone" on the way 
towards the "leap of faith" in building interpersonal trust (Möllering, 2001; Lewis & Weigert, 
1985). The same is true of system trust: it is not just the more global assumptions of 
familiarity or "situational normality" (Luhmann, 1988; Misztal, 2001), but also the fact that 
the respective social system or subsystem is trusted that can act as a reassuring and trust-
facilitating background consideration. 
Interpersonal trust can thus build on organizational trust, and both of these in turn will 
typically build on system trust pertaining to the relevant sector of the life-world. In this sense, 
the different levels of trust are nested inside one another (Shapiro, 1987). 
Thus, adapting a definition by Lahno (2001), we can describe organizational trust as 
follows: An actor who trusts an organization makes themselves vulnerable to the actions of 
others who are guided by the organization, based on what the actor knows about the 
regularities of organizational behavior and about the behavioral incentives and norms as set 
by the organization. From an institutionalization perspective, we may say that 
(inter)organizational trust is enacted as (inter)personal trust in interaction. 
To see that interpersonal and organizational forms of trust are indeed mutually facilitating 
or "recursively related" (Currall & Inkpen, 2002; Sydow, 2006), we need to consider ways in 
which organizational depends on interpersonal trust. This draws our attention to individual 
conduct which can make the organization appear trusting and/or trustworthy, i.e., "facework". 
 
"Facework" between intra- and extra-role behavior 
Taking up Goffman's (1969) concept, Giddens (1990) famously suggested that "facework" is 
done at the access points of organizations. Although virtually every study concerned with 
organizational trust refers to this passage, astoundingly little analysis of the concept has been 
provided in the two decades since. The institutionalization approach taken here can contribute 
to a clarification of the relevant dynamics. 
It is of course correct that without their representatives, organizations would lack any 
capacity for the reciprocity or even interaction indispensable to trust building; it is much 
easier for individual agents to signal predictability and benevolence (Schweer, 2003; Doney 
& Cannon, 1997). The implication, then, is that these signals – somehow – rub off onto an 
external actor's image of the organization. But how? 
We want to suggest a simple formulation of the facework dynamics: When facework 
works effectively (which is far from certain; also see below), trust is invested in the person of 
the representative, but it is "trust qua role", "trust qua group membership" (Lahno, 2001), 
which relates primarily to the positions and roles determined by the organization (Ring & Van 
de Ven, 1994; Apelt, 2003) – that is, trust is elicited by the organization's institutionalized 
roles and routines for demonstrating trustworthiness. A transference from interpersonal to 
organizational trust can occur if the representative's conduct is viewed as typical of the 
organization by the potential trustor, as directed by trustworthy organizational roles and 
routines (Doney & Cannon, 1997). The connection between interpersonal and organizational 
trust established by facework is thus constituted by role-based trust. 
Yet organizational actors are not pre-programmed robots. The institutional perspective 
sensitizes us to the mixture of organizationally determined and individually devised or 
improvised elements inherent in facework. The organization's rules for demonstrating its 
trustworthiness feed into symbolic interaction (facework), where they are enriched by the 
organizational representative's individual creativity. The resulting enactment, in its turn, feeds 
back into organizational roles and routines, where (specific aspects of) it may become 
institutionalized and made available as a basis for future interactions concerned with facework 
(cf. again fig. 1). 
In a second cycle overlaying the first, trust invested in an organization feeds into – but 
does not fully determine – trust in its representative, which is subsequently likely to change in 
degree or kind (e.g. from "thin" to "thick" trust) as a result of interaction. This level of trust in 
the representative can then feed back into organizational trust and may be sustained as such if 
the "right" attributions are made. 
This is one of the distinctive qualities of the role-based trust elicited in facework: in 
interaction, the "compulsory figures" prescribed by organizational roles and routines are 
mixed with the "free skate" (i.e., extra-role behavior) devised or improvised by the individual 
actor. The two may indeed be difficult to tell apart for an external trustor. As Bachmann 
notes, trustors themselves often find it difficult to determine whether their trust pertains more 
to their partner or more to the social system that controls their behavior (1998: 308; also see 
Knights et al., 2001: 315). 
Organizational trust arises from this blend of intra- and extra-role behavior. This yields 
distinctive advantages as well as disadvantages. Of course, a highly competent representative 
(or "boundary spanner"; Adams, 1976, 1980) is needed to credibly represent both an 
organization's aims and values and the roles and routines these are institutionalized in. 
Perceived competence ranks particularly highly as a sign of boundary spanner trustworthiness 
(Hawes et al., 1989). Having an inadequate individual represent the organization is likely to 
erode organizational trust. This may be the case even if the boundary spanner is perceived as 
atypical of the organization, as its institutional system may be considered incapable of assign-
ing suitable individuals to important tasks. In contrast, a competent organizational 
representative can be of great value to the organization (Williams, 2002). The intra-/extra-role 
distinction is often particularly fuzzy in the case of (often comparatively unstructured) 
boundary roles (Bettencourt & Brown, 2003; Walker et al., 1975). Consequently, positive 
patterns of conduct, even where largely based on the boundary spanner's individual abilities, 
can come to be ascribed to the organizational system of institutionalized roles and routines. 
This case represents the clearest example of how interpersonal trust may "rub off" onto 
organizational trust. For this transference to occur, however, particularly where the experience 
of external partners with the organization is limited largely to contact with one representative, 
the latter will typically have to direct observers' attributions actively towards intra-role 
behavior by communicating their commitment to and/or typicality of their own organization. 
As we will see, this fact may directly translate into a source of power for the boundary 
spanner. 
 
Boundary spanners between intra- and interorganizational trust and power 
The above, then, represents variations in the boundary spanner's competence on the one hand, 
and their goodwill towards their own organization on the other – the two basic referents of 
trust (Mayer et al., 1995), as seen from the perspective of relevant organizational members, or 
constituents. This points towards the connections, but also the contradictions between trust 
building within and outside the organization. 
 It is unquestionable that a strong intraorganizational trust culture is likely to be conducive 
to interorganizational trust building as boundary spanners are socialized into effective 
principles of trust building that may transcend contexts and can be "exported" into external 
relationships. (For instance, a study of trust relations in UK book publishing3 showed that 
"going the extra mile" for a partner serves as a trust-evoking signal both internally and 
externally. If the idea of doing so is institutionalized as "normal" within the organization, it 
will be easier for the actor to fall back on the same principle when dealing with external 
partners.) Conversely, interorganizational trust will frequently lead to higher performance on 
the part of the boundary spanner, which is fit to strengthen internal constituents' trust in them 
(Adams, 1980; Williams, 2002).  
 Restricting our observations to the reciprocal facilitation of internal and external trust 
would, however, produce an unduly harmonistic picture of trusting relationships (a problem 
that is not uncommon in the literature; Lewicki et al., 1998). Considering boundary dynamics 
also throws into sharp relief problems of trust and power.  
 No instance of trust is entirely independent of organizational and other power structures 
(Mizrachi et al., 2007). Trust and power enter into sometimes complex interrelationships and 
blends (Bachmann, 2001; Bachmann & van Witteloostuijn, 2009). It has been noted that trust 
can give the trustee some control over the trustor, and (more rarely) that it can give the trustor 
an element of power over the trustee if the latter is dependent on the former's trust to perform 
their tasks adequately (Hardy et al., 1998; Mills & Ungson, 2003). Here, we will restrict our 
observations to an interesting complication of this notion, which results from the 
representative's distinctive position at the boundary between internal and external 
relationships. 
 On the one hand, intraorganizational power, or "clout", is valued highly as a sign that a 
boundary spanner's promises can be trusted (Hawes et al., 1989; Doney & Cannon, 1997). 
Conversely, and more problematically, the intraorganizational power of boundary spanners 
may often centrally derived from their close and trusting relationships with important external 
partners (Adams, 1980; Whetten, 1978). 
 The comparatively high discretion that is characteristic of many boundary roles (Walker 
et al., 1975) is open to abuse by the boundary spanner. Because they are a potential source of 
intraorganizational power, the boundary spanner may be "protective of the relationships ... 
and seek to maintain and exploit them rather than simply (loyally) pass them on to the firm" 
(Hanlon, 2004: 203-4). That is, they may take care to have the partner's trust focused on them 
as an individual rather than as an organizational representative. If they purposefully present 
themselves as disconnected from or atypical of the organization, no trust in the organization 
will ensue (Sydow, 2006). Even distrust may be engendered if a trusted partner is seen to feel 
the need to distance themselves from their organization. That is, the boundary spanner may 
egoistically harness external trust as a source of internal power. 
 Our study of UK book publishing, for instance, showed that editors' success is often tied 
to their close and trusting relationships with one or more bestselling authors. These trust 
relationships often remain strongly individualized and largely disconnected from the 
organization. When an editor is "poached" by a competitor, this is evidenced by authors 
following them to the new publisher. Indeed, this is not an uncommon occurrence. Whether 
the purely personal nature of these trust relationships is actively preserved by the editor or 
not, senior executives confirm that they give high intraorganizational influence and power to 
the editor. 
 Interestingly, whereas trust typically tends to be associated with legitimate power only 
(Sydow, 2006; Ireland & Webb, 2007), external trust can be used to harness internal power 
which is likely to be illegitimate. Instead of prioritizing organizational interests, it results 
from conscious egoistic strategizing at the expense of organizational norms. (Note, however, 
that this does not as such tell us anything about its (lack of) "morality" (Brenkert, 1998; Baier, 
1986). We will discuss this question in some more detail towards the end of this paper.) 
 This possibility regularly leads to acute intraorganizational dilemmas. They are centered 
around the boundary spanner's role autonomy (Perrone et al., 2003) as the pivotal link 
between internal and external trust relations. 
 The representative's organizational constituents, on the one hand, are likely to be 
conscious of the potential for abuse that their role autonomy affords the representative. 
Internal suspicion and doubt about their loyalties are "classic" problems surrounding 
boundary spanning positions (Adams, 1980; Aldrich & Herker, 1977). At the same time, 
constituents may be aware that revoking internal trust and restricting the boundary spanner's 
autonomy is likely to have a negative effect on their ability and/or willingness to engage in 
effective facework. In addition to curbing the autonomy to take decisions which is central to 
external trust building (Williams, 2002), there is a risk of these measures acting as a self-
fulfilling prophecy, affecting the representative's job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment, and reducing their motivation to represent the organization favorably to others 
(Walker et al., 1975; Goolsby, 1992). Decreased commitment will lead, first and foremost, to 
the withdrawal of just those extra-role behaviors central to effective facework (Organ, 1988; 
Jex, 1998). This type of  behavior is difficult, if not impossible to enforce (often even to 
define; Bettencourt & Brown, 2003), making it virtually impossible to coerce an actor into 
trust building behavior. 
 The boundary spanner, by contrast, will be faced with the problem of convincing 
organizational constituents of their trustworthiness. (This is of relevance both to egoistic and 
organizationally committed, to powerful and less powerful representatives. Even powerful 
boundary spanners tend to opt for "softer" solutions as long as they can avoid the risks of 
coercive power use; Nonis et al., 1996; Molm, 1997.) Beyond the potential for conflict 
inherent in all boundary roles, caused by the often contradictory expectations placed in them 
by external vs. internal partners, as well as different groups within their own organization 
(Whetten, 1978; Kahn et al., 1964), boundary spanners are faced with a dimension of role 
conflict that is specific to the trust chain at whose centre they are placed. 
 In external relations, it is crucial for the representative to signal some autonomy from 
their own organization, as well as a commitment to the interests jointly formulated with the 
external partners (Perrone et al., 2003). By contrast, those internal constituents in doubt about 
boundary spanner loyalty will demand demonstrations of unwavering commitment to the 
home organization. This conflict is not easily solved by switching between behavioral styles 
for different audiences (Organ, 1971), as often both sides will look to concrete business 
decisions, for instance when suspicious internal constituents demand evidence of "hard" 
bargaining tactics (Brown, 1983).  
 Further research is necessary to elucidate in how far the contradiction between 
simultaneously signalling autonomy externally and conformity internally constitutes a type of 
role conflict intrinsic to interorganizational trust building. But it is evident that the 
organization and its members face problems of trust and power for which no off-the-shelf 
solutions exist.  
 
"Trusting organizations": Organizations as subjects of trust 
 
So far, the institutionalization perspective has facilitated an understanding of how, in inter-
organizational trust building, the referent or object of trust can move from the personal to the 
organizational level (in facework) and back (when organizational trust serves as a background 
for interpersonal trust building). The more fascinating question remains: can the source of 
trust move across these levels too? I.e., (how) can the organization as an entity be a subject of 
trust, and if so, what are its connections with interpersonal trust building between individuals? 
 For this inquiry, we will address several questions from an institutionalization 
perspective: How can (the subject of) trust move from the interpersonal to the 
interorganizational level, and how can we envisage the resulting form of trust? How can this 
type of trust persist across groups and over time? These questions – concerning institutional 
production and structure, and institutional reproduction and transmission, respectively – will 
be addressed in consecutive sections. 
 
The production of institutionalized trust 
For an understanding of the process of institutionalization we can turn to Berger & 
Luckmann's  classic account. Their institutionalization theory can be condensed into one core 
statement: "Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of 
habitualized actions by types of actors. Put differently, any such typification is an institution" 
(1967: 72). Thus, patterns of conduct which are successful in generating or maintaining trust 
may be replicated due to the economy of effort this affords the actors, and they are likely to 
start being understood as patterns, simultaneously ascribing roles to the actors involved in 
them (e.g., that of "trusted supplier"). Importantly, these typifications may come to be shared 
as a result of continuing interaction, so that each actor knows what to expect of the other and 
what the other is likely to expect of them. The actors' trusting conduct, then, comes to be 
coordinated through the development of matching expectations (Weick, 1985; David, 1994). 
Once third parties are introduced to these patterns of trusting (on which see the following two 
sections), the patterns that were initially devised possibly as a mere ad hoc solution to the 
problems of (lacking) time and information in everyday business have been externalized and 
objectified. The actors can be seen to have contributed another segment to "an intersubjective 
world known-or-knowable-in-common-with-others" (Zimmerman & Pollner, quoted in 
Zucker, 1991). 
 We can now turn to the resulting institutional structures. We view trust as 
institutionalized in the form of intersubjective templates for trusting (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). 
These serve both as "reading guides", giving the actor a guideline for recognizing, 
interpreting, and evaluating actions as symbolic for trust and/or trustworthiness, and "writing 
guides", providing the actor with a "script" for constructing their own trusting and/or 
trustworthy conduct. They are further specified by roles and routines for trusting (i.e., both the 
action and the actor are typified by the institution, as described above). The templates and 
their specifications are the central means of harmonizing expectations and channeling 
interaction. Both their effects on interaction and their specification into roles and routines are 
mediated by situational influences. 
 Trust is certainly a largely "virtual" institution, i.e., it exists principally in interaction and 
in the memory traces of human actors (Giddens, 1984), and is not easily observable in any 
formalized structural form. This should not, however, be taken to mean that trust as an 
institution is immaterial or inconsequential. While the institutionalized trust templates contain 
symbolic information only (i.e., guides for symbolic action), this includes guides to the 
symbolic handling of material resources. The aforementioned study, for instance, confirmed 
that in economic relations, the more effective trust expressions are generally those which 
commit resources to the relationship (e.g., advance payment, which was rated highly as an 
expression of trust in business transactions in our empirical study). Thus we consider the 
institutionalized trust templates, as the institution's "idea", to be embedded into networks of 
relationships and resource configurations (Sewell, 1992; Campbell, 2004; Clemens & Cook, 
1999). 
 With the creation of the structures described, trust has moved from its "liquid" state in 
interpersonal interaction to a more "solid" one on the organizational level (cf. again fig. 1). At 
the same time, we have already seen that institutionalized trust can only persist if it is 
continuously "brought to life" in creative interaction. 
 
The reproduction of institutionalized trust 
The organization, as a distinguishable entity, will only be truly consequential as a subject of 
trust if there is a degree of stability in the way action is organized over time. How, then, can 
such relative stability come about? 4 
 We have conceived of institutionalized trust as intersubjective templates guiding the 
formulation of symbolic action. Put simply, the institution thus provides a symbolic 
repertoire, much as in Swidler's well-known conception of culture as a "tool kit" of symbolic 
elements to be employed by actors in devising meaningful conduct (Swidler, 1986; Mizrachi 
et al., 2007). The influence of the templates is thus largely tacit; they act as cognitive and 
normative "locks" on interaction (Campbell, 2004). Formal interventions and sanctions, in 
contrast, may even have deinstitutionalizing effects (Zucker, 1991). The channeling of 
expectations introduces a degree of stability into the reproduction of the institutionalized 
templates, as the interactions that are both their result and their subsequent basis are enabled, 
but also constrained by the existing symbolic repertoire. 
 Importantly, this repertoire does not simply consist of ready-made symbols. The plain 
repetition of ready-made patterns (as sometimes proposed in "management guides", or e.g. in 
Elsbach (2004), who tries to prescribe particular ways of talking and dressing) would not be 
sufficient to evoke trust. As Luhmann (1979) reminds us, mere role fulfilment is not a strong 
trust-evoking sign. Potential trustors typically need to feel the trustee's individual 
commitment to the relationship (Goffman, 1953). 
 Indeed, the institutionalized trust templates do not provide prefabricated symbols, but 
only symbolic cores, along with a rough guide for the actors on how to structure further 
situationally, personally, and historically specific layers of meaning around those cores. The 
resulting symbolic expressions of trust and/or trustworthiness can be individually credible, 
while their common core ensures their "legibility" among the relevant institutional actors.  
 In the aforementioned study of UK book publishing, for instance, a way of personalizing 
symbolic conduct mentioned by a majority of respondents was learning and communicating 
about both partners' "style" (specified either with reference to "taste", in editorial work, or to 
specific "ways of working", in departments such as Production). Both manifestations are apt 
to demonstrate to the partners that theirs is a highly personalized relationship, the concrete 
expressions of which result centrally from their interpersonal history. 
 The efficacy of institutionalized trust in ensuring its continuous reproduction is thus 
largely based on the imprecision of its symbolic repertoire, as it "do[es] not tell us what to 
mean, but give[s] us the capacity to make meaning" (Cohen, 1985: 16).  
 Institutionalized trust, then, allows organizational actors to bring to bear their agency and 
creativity in constructing symbolic expressions with which they can engage in "symbolic 
exchange" (Haas & Deseran, 1981) to signal their trust and/or trustworthiness to others. We 
can thus conceive of institutionalized trust as symbolically mediated. To visualize this 
process, we adapt a structurationist representation by Barley & Tolbert (1997), modifying it to 
depict symbols as an intermediate "layer" inbetween the institutional and interactional realms, 
acting as pivots between them (cf. fig. 2).5 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 The figure demonstrates the centrality of symbolic mediation in the loose coupling of 
structure and interaction with regard to trust. While the institutionalized symbolic cores are 
the source of stability of trust over time, their use is highly creative and allows for great 
variation. Consequently, the trust patterns commonly in use at different points in time will 
rarely be fully identical. Instead, the institutional repertoire circumscribes a path-dependent 
trajectory of trust determined by the institution's history as well as the agency and creativity 
of the actors who participate in continuing it. Actors' agency can be channeled into a common 
path particularly because even agency, as the ability to "act otherwise" (Giddens, 1984), is 
always oriented towards existing structures (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). 
 The notion of path dependence is particularly helpful as it demonstrates how relative 
stability can be achieved not only through the (near-)identical reproduction of 
institutionalized trust patterns, but also by their further "deepening", i.e., their reinforcement 
in institutional reproduction as they become more deeply ingrained over time (David, 1994; 
Mahoney, 2000). This development often relies on a logic of "increasing returns" in which the 
lock-in of institutional development occurs because certain benefits would likely be lost if 
institutional practices were to change radically (Arthur, 1994; Pierson, 2000). 
 
The transmission of institutionalized trust 
Importantly, however, it is not just the patterns of trusting that change over time; the 
operation of the institutionalization cycle also is not restricted to the original set of actors. 
These can change between its rhythms (i.e., in fig. 2 the individuals enacting the 
institutionalized practices need not be the same between times T1, T2, T3). The 
institutionalized core patterns of trusting are exterior to the actors and can accordingly be 
transmitted to other organizational actors as fact (Zucker, 1991). Transmission takes place in 
organizational or team socialization and generally takes one of two forms. Direct historical 
transmission occurs when a newly arriving role incumbent is in direct contact with their 
predecessor (often in an induction or "shadowing" routine designed to support the transfer of 
tacit knowledge; Feldman & Pentland, 2003). More typically, transmission involves first the 
lateral diffusion of trusting practices within an organization and the subsequent socialization 
of new members. In both variants, the newcomer is introduced not only to their formal 
responsibilities, but simultaneously to the informal roles they may take on in specific trust 
relationships (Louis, 1980).  
 Indeed, it is only in socialization (and/or the preceding lateral diffusion) that the cycle of 
institutionalization perfects itself. For a third party being introduced to the existing way of 
organizing action, the patterns of trusting are likely to appear "as an opus alienum over which 
he has no control rather than as the opus proprium of his own productive activity" (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967: 106). With this enhanced degree of facticity, the objectification of the 
institution is complete. The institutionalized patterns, then, are highly exterior to each 
individual encountering them and are more easily transmitted to new generations of 
organizational actors (Schutz, 1962). 
 Importantly, then, the path dependence effects described above are disembedded from the 
individual relationships that constituted the original context of interpersonal and inter-
organizational trust building. The externalized and objectified patterns, and with them the 
influence of the interorganizational trust history, can persist after the patterns' creator has left 
the organization. What is more, they can persist after all members of the organizations 
involved have been replaced. We found an exemplary case in the aforementioned empirical 
study in which a Production Director explained that the existing high-trust relationship 
between her publishing house and their chief printers had evolved over the past sixty to 
seventy years, starting soon after World War II. (This assessment was confirmed by three 
other respondents, including the respective printing company's former Sales Director.) This 
time span exceeds the tenure of any individual in the companies concerned. Nonetheless, 
according to respondents, the trust relationship has continued, growing in intensity over time. 
The present trust between representatives of the two firms is seen to be a result crucially of 
this interfirm history.  
 The significance of individually devised extra-role behavior in trust building means that 
recruitment procedures can play an important role in the degree to which institutionalized 
trust patterns persist. In our empirical study, several respondents reflected on this fact. One of 
them even equated the longevity of their organization's trust culture with persistently 
recruiting a particular kind of suitable individuals for this task. 
 In this example, it is particularly obvious that while its reproduction remains connected to 
the actions of individuals, the interfirm trust relationship has gained a life of its own. The 
historically grown trust trajectory has become truly interorganizational, as specific ways of 
trusting conduct have outlasted the replacement of all individuals involved. It is not just the 
trusting patterns at any given point in time, but also the historically grown trajectory as a 
whole that are exterior to the actors. Even though trust (and its continuous reproduction) is 
enacted interpersonally, the source of trust has moved on to the interorganizational level. 
 
The institutionalization of trust and power 
Through its institutionalization, then, trust can be sustained over long periods of time, and the 
benefits of trusting relationships can be preserved even beyond changes in personnel. Again, 
we should not uncritically welcome this possibility, however. We have noted that trust can 
create unwelcome complications of power. We will consider two ways in which processes of 
institutionalization can exacerbate these: by making trust more visible, or power less visible. 
 Through their externalization and transmission to third actors, patterns of trust may 
become more clearly visible. As a result, trust may become more liable to political 
interference through the attempts of powerful actors to manipulate the meanings associated 
with it (Hardy et al., 1998). It also presents those actors with higher incentives for 
manipulation than an isolated trust relation whose principles only apply to a single dyad. 
After all, an institution is also crucially "a structure in which powerful people are committed 
to some value or interest" (Stinchcombe, 1968: 107). And by benefiting certain groups within 
the organization but not others, institutionalized trust is likely to create a constituency 
defending it (Clemens & Cook, 1999). Consequently, relevant actors may use their power to 
try and determine which practices are retained in the institutional repertoire – or removed 
from it. That is, they are exercising their power by structuring the discourse that surrounds 
institutionalized trust (Foucault, 1979, 1980). 
 UK book publishing, for instance, used to be entirely editorially oriented in its approach 
to business. Centralized departments for sales, production, HR, and other "corporate" 
functions are a relatively more recent trend (Schiffrin, 2001). In our empirical study, a group 
of managers from these departments related their ambition to break up the traditional patterns 
of relationship conduct that were still found in their departments. Specifically, they were 
aiming to curtail the traditional reliance on highly individualized interpersonal trust 
relationships in favour of a more "professional", formalized approach to trust building. To 
achieve changes in the institutionalized patterns, they used a combination of formal and 
informal power to influence the outcome of this clash, both through a rigorous socialization  
of new members and by vigorously "pushing back" against the "cultural resistance" they 
encountered.6 
 We can understand this as a power struggle centered around the question: who controls 
trust? Who determines how it is built and what it is used for? It is thus obvious that conscious 
attempts at manipulating institutional patterns can be to the detriment of the organization 
(and/or groups within it) if they aim at intraorganizational political advantage rather than 
organizational effectiveness (Farrell & Petersen, 1982; Ailon, 2006).  
 Foucault reminds us, however, that the exercise of power need not be intentional (1979; 
also see McCabe, 2010). Instead, it is inextricably intertwined with subjectivity of the actors 
(Knights & Willmott, 1989). While those respondents who argued for a formalization of trust 
regarded this as an element of the professionalism that formed part of their self-definition as 
an executive, others explained that it was precisely the impossibility of this formalization that 
was at the heart of their self-understanding as editors and publishers. Clearly, this power 
struggle is closely tied to the subjectivity of the respondents. 
 This points us towards ways in which an institutionalization of trust can make power less 
visible. As Smart (1983: 88) points out following Foucault, this is when power is at its most 
effective. When considering boundary dynamics, we noted that (external) trust may serve as a 
basis for potentially illegitimate (internal) power, and that no off-the-shelf solutions exist for 
this problem. Where trust thus serves as a basis for power, the institutionalization of the 
former runs the risk of perpetuating the latter. 
 When institutionalized patterns of building and using trust are reproduced, effects of path 
dependence can preserve power imbalances even after their original moral or rational basis 
(such as a specific, highly significant trust relationship) has disappeared (Mahoney, 2000). 
Even more problematically, if this reproduction ensues in an unreflexive manner over long 
periods of time, patterns of trusting can become increasingly taken for granted (Kern, 1998; 
Möllering, 2006a) – and, with them, the power relations they give rise to. Where this occurs, 
power can gain the highly effective tacit influence that Lukes (1974) designated as the "third 
face of power". It enters into actors' "perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way 
that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or 
imagine no alternative to it, or because they view it as natural and unchangeable, or because 
they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial" (Lukes, 1974: 24). 
 This type of trust-based power has the potential to be highly stable and enduring, as it is 
extremely difficult to address or challenge. Its taken-for-grantedness and tacit influence, 
produced by "deep" institutionalization, combines with being encapsulated in trust relations 
which have immensely positive connotations. Actors are much less likely to find support for 
challenging patterns of behavior which are generally acknowledged as productive, prosocial, 
and altruistic (Uslaner, 2002). Thus, this kind of power is most stable and effective when it 
becomes ingrained in institutionalized patterns, and its innocuous "façade of trust" (Hardy et 
al., 1998) is institutionalized with it. 
  
Trust, power and subjectivity 
The above argument contributes a new and hitherto unseen angle to a growing literature 
discussing the manifold interrelations between trust, power and control (e.g. Bachmann et al., 
2001, Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005, 2007). At the same time, relying exclusively on 
Lukes's conceptualization would leave our analysis of trust and power truncated. Again, 
Foucault's insights into the connection between power and subjectivity can help us understand 
the shortcomings not just of Lukes's concept, but also of much previous theorizing on the 
connection between trust and power. 
 A Foucauldian stance chimes with our analytical perspective far better than it may first 
appear. Substantively, our interest here lies exactly with those "micropolitics" or 
"microphysics" of power that Foucault's analysis elucidates (1979; also see Samra-Fredericks, 
2005). (Meta)theoretically, its explanatory logic shows some affinities with a constructivist 
outlook (Reed, 2001). Above all, no one has shown more convincingly than Foucault how 
"power produces reality" (1979: 194). In this sense, then, Foucault's insights can offer a 
complement to Berger & Luckmann's theory, which has attracted recurrent criticism for its 
relative neglect of power (Scott, 2008).7 
 This perspective makes the shortcomings of Lukes's concept readily apparent. Not only 
does the latter conceive of power as a largely static property of persons or institutions 
(McCabe, 2010). It also shares with much of older labor process theory (in the tradition of 
Braverman, 1974) the implicit assumption that power is unilaterally "held by the powerful 
and wielded over the powerless", and thus fundamentally negative and repressive in nature 
(Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994: 169; Knights & Willmott, 1989). 
 This negative view of power in particular connects to some older critical approaches to 
trust. As Adler notes, a long line of theory has tended to view trust as little more than "a thin 
veneer [hiding] the underlying reality of domination" (2001: 221). Here, trust often features 
only as an element of the process of "manufacturing consent" (Burawoy, 1979), cementing 
relations of domination (also see Reed, 2001). Another, more optimistic line of reasoning 
tended to agree on the harsh realities of power and domination as presently existent, but 
predicted their replacement by models of trust-based communities which were often all but 
utopian in nature (Heckscher, 2001: 235-6; Knights et al., 2001: 313-4; Ailon, 2006: 777). 
 From of a Foucauldian point of view, none of these positions appear tenable. Both of 
these strands of thinking (we could call them "pessimistic" and "optimistic", respectively), as 
well as Lukes's concept, presuppose a counterfactual identification of the "real" wants and 
interests of those subject to domination, which they could pursue or realize in the absence of 
power (Ailon, 2006; Knights & Willmott, 1989: 539-41). From a Foucauldian perspective, 
this appears a contradiction in terms, as power is ubiquitous and fundamentally pervades all 
social practice (Knights et al., 1993). Because subjectivity is constituted within and through 
the very power relations that it helps (re)produce, it is not thinkable outside relations of power 
(Knights & Willmott, 1989). 
 (An interesting idea – albeit one which would require a study in its own right to explore 
in greater depth – would be to ask in how far these points apply to trust, too. Foucault's late 
lectures, in Luxon's analysis (2004), indicate that trust, too, can be productive of subjectivity. 
But where power "produces" individuals, trust allows for "educating" them. Although the 
connotations are very different (with trust linked to notions of self-actualization; Luxon, 
2004: 465-6), both trust and power are inextricably interlinked with the individual's sense of 
self. Indeed, while a number of the respondents in our empirical study cited influence in the 
organization and in the industry as an important element of their identity as a publisher, more 
of them emphasized that at the heart of their professional identity lay their ability to build 
lasting trust relations, particularly with talented authors.) 
 Whether we subscribe to this latter, yet tentative, notion or prefer to view trust merely as 
a basis of power in this context, the Foucauldian perspective adopted makes unmistakably 
clear that we must view power neither as a static background nor simply as a negative 
counterpoint to trust, but that instead we need to acknowledge the pervasive interplay of 
complex blends of trust and power with the ways in which actors define themselves, their 
organizational roles, identities and actions. 
 
Conclusion: Trust and its movement across analytical levels 
 
In this contribution, we have reappraised the production and reproduction of 
interorganizational trust from an institutionalization perspective. Our chief insights from this 
are twofold. 
 Firstly, we believe that the usefulness of the institutionalization perspective in analyzing 
interorganizational trust has been demonstrated beyond doubt. We did not follow a 
monolithically institutionalist approach, but enriched our social constructionist framework 
with elements of structuration theory, and added insights from strategic and critical 
perspectives where appropriate. Nonetheless, the substantive issue of institutionalization has 
been at the heart of all stages of our argument. 
 We considered institutionalized roles and routines as the object of organizational trust, 
the generation of the latter in "facework" through a blend of intra- and extra-role behavior, 
and the strategic decoupling of these two elements to create potentially illegitimate power 
bases within organizations. In each of these cases we have been concerned with 
institutionalized role prescriptions and the ways in which individuals creatively (and 
sometimes deviously) make use of them. This interest in the interplay of institutionalized 
structure and individual agency is visible even more clearly in our account of the production, 
reproduction, and transmission of institutionalized trust patterns. The path dependence of 
institutionalized trust results precisely from the creative impetus towards constant, typically 
incremental, change within relatively stable institutional boundaries. 
 Of course, the occurrence of coherent and positive trust histories is anything but certain 
or inevitable. Individual agency allows actors to "act otherwise", and thus to break existing 
paths and/or create new ones (Crouch & Farrell, 2004; Sydow et al., 2004). The present 
contribution does not aim to deny that regardless of a history of trust, one sufficiently grave 
breach of trust by one actor may be able to break down trust permanently. It simply focuses 
on relatively stable paths of trust as a hitherto understudied phenomenon. 
 Secondly and more importantly, our approach revealed a distinctive movement of trust 
between the interpersonal micro and the organizational meso level. This finding applies, on 
the one hand, to the object of trust. Interpersonal trust in a representative can be translated 
into organizational trust through facework (depending among other things on the competence 
and goodwill of the representative, and on internal trust relations with constituents); 
subsequently, existing organizational trust can serve as a background for the building of 
further interpersonal trust. On the other hand, the source or subject of trust, too, can be seen to 
move between levels. Through the dynamics of institutionalization, individual trusting 
behavior can transcend the interpersonal level and become an attribute of the organization; 
this orientation subsequently feeds into further trusting conduct of its members. Indeed, since 
this is the origin of the "collective orientation" in the terms of which Zaheer and colleagues 
(1998) define interorganizational trust, it may seem even more useful to speak of an 
"institutionalized trust orientation" in this context. 
 As a direct result of the above we have seen that trust situated on the (inter)organizational 
level does indeed warrant consideration in its own right. It could be argued that the 
institutionalization perspective adopted here has provided an affirmative answer to the classic 
question: can organizations trust? (Sydow, 2006) Our insights even indicate that organizations 
are capable of "active trust" (Giddens, 1994). We do not, however, consider it of prime 
importance whether or not we may speak of organizations as "trustors". We regard this as a 
largely semantic question, depending crucially on the definition of trust adopted, especially 
whether it refers primarily to observable action or to psychological or emotional states; 
(Currall & Inkpen, 2002; Janowicz & Noorderhaven, 2006). Rather, our core finding here is 
that as seen from an institutionalization perspective, interorganizational trust unfolds complex 
dynamics which cannot be reduced to individual behaviors. Its status as a distinct construct 
becomes apparent through the path dependence effects that interorganizational trust histories 
exert on trusting conduct. 
 The model, as presented in such confined space, obviously had to remain limited in 
scope, but is open to augmentation. The applicability of the basic model is not necessarily 
restricted to an interorganizational context, but could be used to investigate 
intraorganizational  relations. Trust within organizations, too, can be institutionalized in roles 
and routines and its influence on interaction symbolically mediated. An obvious and fruitful 
extension would be the inclusion of trust on the systemic macro level, especially with regard 
to the translation of interpersonal and organizational trust into "system trust" (Luhmann, 
1979; Giddens, 1990). (Indeed, a corresponding project is in the planning stage.) Lastly, a 
complex, but particularly promising extension of the model could consider symbolic 
expressions of power as well as trust, and the ways in which the intertwined expressions of 
the two are institutionalized and reproduced over time. 
 For the present time, however, we hold that our approach has made a meaningful 
contribution to the study of trust by outlining the dynamics of its institutionalization and 
reproduction, and by identifying a movement of trust across analytical levels which is 
constitutive of all interorganizational trust. We are confident that it will prove a fruitful basis 
for further inquiry into this important topic. 
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Notes
                                                
1 This is not meant to imply that macro level factors are insignificant in trust building, but 
merely that they had to remain outside the central focus of this paper. Although the model 
presented is able to accommodate explanatory factors at all analytical levels, we would have 
to focus on a different set of processes and translation mechanisms for a methodical inclusion 
of macro level variables. For an insightful example of this, see Lane & Bachmann (1996, 
1997). Also note that we do not pursue a dogmatic institutionalism. Our analysis aims less at 
developing institutional theory than at advancing substantive insights into the topic of 
interorganizational trust. 
2 Note that institutionalization can take place on the organizational level, or on the team level 
within the organization. While we do not mention this in every instance to avoid unnecessary 
repetition, this should be noted with regard to all institutionalization dynamics treated here. 
3 The study, carried out to establish the basic validity of our conceptual ideas, consisted of 21 
in-depth qualitative interviews (of one to two and a half hours) with senior executives in some 
of the major UK trade publishers, as well as some of their external partners. Interviewing 
                                                                                                                                                   
techniques were based on a combination of "focused" and "depth interviews" (Sarantakos, 
1993); data analysis employed a content analysis methodology (Lamnek, 1989). 
4 Note that our present interest is in the stability, or the successful "deepening", of institution-
alized trust. This focus of the analysis is not meant to imply lack of change in the object 
studied; nor to deny that attempts at maintaining and/or reinforcing trust may fail, or may not 
even be undertaken. Even after a long history of successful institutionalization and reproduct-
ion, trust can start spiralling downwards or break down suddenly. We are aware that actors' 
agency and creativity enables them to reinterpret, change, sidestep or ignore existing 
institutional roles and routines. Our focus here arises from a fascination with the possibility of 
relative stability over time. 
5 This graph effectively "unrolls" the cycle depicted in fig. 1, with each rhythm representing a 
turn of the cycle. This conception enriches our framework with insights from structuration 
theory (Giddens, 1984; Barley & Tolbert, 1997). This blending of constructionist and 
structurationist frameworks was already implicit in our treatment of the structures of 
institutionalized trust. 
6 The short quotes were contributed by a Production Director at a major London publisher. 
7 We could also see parallels to the Foucauldian concept of "power/knowledge" (1979, 1980) 
here. In the case quoted, the power of the boundary spanner is at least partially derived from 
their expert knowledge as a publisher. Importantly, however, we would argue that it is not just 
these "theoretical or systematized bodies of knowledge" (which most theory has tended to 
focus on), but also "informal knowledges … in specific localized settings" that may play a 
decisive role (Knights & Morgan, 1994: 137). These informal knowledges may concern both 
the uncodifiable understanding of the creative process shared between editor and author, and 
the tacit knowledge necessary to understand and navigate the economic and social networks 
involved (also see McCabe, 2010: 154; Hudson & Wong-MingJi, 2001: 397). 
References 
 
Adams, S. (1976) 'The Structure and Dynamics of Behavior in Organizational Boundary 
Roles', in M.D. Dunnette (ed.), Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 
pp. 1175-99. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Adams, S. (1980) 'Interorganizational Processes and Organization Boundary Activities', 
Research in Organizational Behavior 2: 321-55. 
Adler, P.S. (2001) 'Market, Hierarchy, and Trust: The Knowledge Economy and the Future of 
Capitalism', Organization Science 12: 215-34. 
Ailon, G. (2006) 'What B Would Otherwise Do: A Critique of Conceptualizations of ‘Power’ 
in Organizational Theory', Organization 13: 771-800. 
Aldrich, H. and Herker, D. (1977) 'Boundary Spanning Roles and Organization Structure', 
Academy of Management Review 2: 217-230. 
Apelt, M. (2003) 'Bürokratische Strukturen stützen Vertrauen', Erwägen Wissen Ethik 14: 
332-3. 
Arnott, D.C. (2007) 'Research on trust: A bibliography and brief bibliometric analysis of the 
special issue submissions', European Journal of Marketing 41: 1203-40. 
Arrighetti, A., Bachmann, R. and Deakin, S. (1997) 'Contract law, social norms and inter-firm 
cooperation', Cambridge Journal of Economics 21: 171-95. 
Arthur, B.W. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Bachmann, R. (1998) 'Conclusion: Trust – Conceptual Aspects of a Complex Phenomenon', 
in C. Lane and R. Bachmann (eds), Trust Within and Between Organizations, pp. 298-
322. Oxford: OUP. 
Bachmann, R. (2001) 'Trust, Power and Control in Trans-Organizational Relations', 
Organization Studies 22: 337-65. 
Bachmann, R., Knights, D. and Sydow, J., eds (2001) Trust and Control in Organizational 
Relations, Organization Studies special issue 22(2). 
Bachmann, R. and van Witteloostuijn, A. (2009) 'Analyzing Inter-Organizational 
Relationships in the Context of their National Business Systems: A Conceptual 
Framework for Comparative Research', European Societies 11: 49-76. 
Baier, A. (1986) 'Trust and Antitrust', Ethics 96: 231-60. 
Barley, S.R. and Tolbert, P.S. (1997) 'Institutionalization and Structuration: Studying the 
Links between Action and Institution', Organization Studies 18: 93-117. 
Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. (1967) The Social Construction of Reality. London: Penguin. 
Bettencourt, L.A. and Brown, S.W. (2003) 'Role Stressors and Customer-Oriented Boundary-
Spanning Behaviors in Service Organizations', Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science 31: 394-408. 
Bigley, G.A. and Pearce, J.L. (1998) 'Straining for Shared Meaning in Organization Science: 
Problems of Trust and Distrust', Academy of Management Review 23: 405-21. 
Bijlsma-Frankema, K. and Costa, A.C., eds (2005) The Trust-Control Nexus in 
Organizational Relations, International Sociology special issue 20(3). 
Bijlsma-Frankema, K. and Costa, A.C., eds (2007) Trust and Control Interrelations: New 
Perspectives on the Trust – Control Nexus, Group & Organization Management special 
issue 32(4). 
Braverman, H. (1974) Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Books. 
Brenkert, G.G. (1998) 'Trust, Morality and International Business', in C. Lane and R. 
Bachmann (eds) Trust Within and Between Organizations, pp. 273-97. Oxford: OUP. 
Brown, L. D. (1983) Managing Conflict at Organizational Interfaces. Reading, Mass.: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Burawoy, M. (1979) Manufacturing Consent. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Campbell, J.L. (2004) Institutional Change and Globalization. Princeton: PUP. 
Clemens, E.S. and Cook, J.M. (1999) 'Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and 
Change', Annual Review of Sociology 25: 441-66. 
Cohen, A.P. (1985) The Symbolic Construction of Community. Chichester: Horwood. 
Crouch, C. and Farrell, H. (2004) 'Breaking the Path of Institutional Devlopment? 
Alternatives to the New Determinism', Rationality and Society 16: 5-43. 
Currall, S.C. and Inkpen, A.C. (2002) 'A Multilevel Approach to Trust in Joint Ventures', 
Journal of International Business Studies 33: 479-95. 
David, P.A. (1994) 'Why are Institutions the "Carriers of History"? Path Dependence and the 
Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions', Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics 5: 205-20. 
Dirks, K.T. and Ferrin, D.L. (2001) 'The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings', 
Organization Science 12: 450-67. 
Doney, P.M. and Cannon, J.P. (1997) 'An Examination of the Nature of Trust in Buyer–Seller 
Relationships', Journal of Marketing 61: 35-51. 
Elsbach, K.D. (2004) 'Managing Images of Trustworthiness in Organizations', in R.M. 
Kramer and K.S. Cook (eds), Trust and Distrust in Organizations, pp. 275-92. New 
York: Russel Sage. 
Emirbayer, M. and Mische, A. (1998) 'What is Agency?', American Journal of Sociology 103: 
962-1023. 
Fang, E., Palmatier, R.W., Scheer, L.K. and Li, N. (2008) 'Trust at Different Organizational 
Levels', Journal of Marketing 72: 80-98. 
Farrell, D. and Petersen, J.C. (1982) 'Patterns of Political Behavior in Organizations', 
Academy of Management Review 7: 403-12. 
Feldman, M.S. and Pentland, B.T. (2003) 'Reconceptualizing Routines as a Source of 
Flexibility and Change', Admininstrative Science Quarterly 48: 94-118. 
Ferrin, D.L., Dirks, K.T. and Shah, P.P. (2006) 'Direct and Indirect Effects of Third-Party 
Relationships on Interpersonal Trust', Journal of Applied Psychology 91: 870-83. 
Foucault, M. (1979) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. 
Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77, ed. 
C. Gordon. Brighton: Harvester. 
Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: SUP. 
Giddens, A. (1994) 'Risk, Trust, Reflexivity', in U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash (eds), 
Reflexive Modernization, pp. 184-197. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Goffman, E. (1953) 'Communication Conduct in an Island Community', doctoral dissertation, 
University of Chicago. 
Goffman, E. (1969) Strategic Interaction. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Goolsby, J.R. (1992) 'A Theory of Role Stress in Boundary Spanning Positions of Marketing 
Organizations', Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 20: 155-64. 
Govier, T. (1994) 'Is it a jungle out there? Trust, distrust, and the social construction of 
reality', Dialogue 33: 237-52. 
Grandori, A. and Soda, G. (1995) 'Inter-firm networks: Antecedents, mechanisms and forms', 
Organization Studies 16: 183-214. 
Gulati, R. and Sytch, M. (2008) 'Does Familarity Breed Trust? Revisiting the Antecedents of 
Trust', Managerial and Decision Economics 29: 165-90. 
Haas, D.F. and Deseran, F.A. (1981) 'Trust and Symbolic Exchange', Social Psychology 
Quarterly 44: 3-13. 
Hagen, J.M. and Simons, T.M. (2003) 'Differentiating Trust-in-the-Company from Trust-in-
the-Executive in Supply Chain Relations', paper presented at the Academy of 
Management meeting, Seattle. 
Hanlon, G. (2004) 'Institutional Forms and Organizational Structures: Homology, Trust and 
Reputational Capital in Professional Service Firms', Organization 11: 187-210. 
Hardy, C., Phillips, N. and Lawrence, T. (1998) ‘Distinguishing Trust and Power in 
Interorganizational Relations: Forms and Façades of Trust’, in C. Lane and R. Bachmann 
(eds) Trust Within and Between Organizations, pp. 64–87. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hawes, J.M., Mast, K.E. and Swan, J.E. (1989) 'Trust Earning Perceptions of Sellers and 
Buyers', Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management 9: 1-8. 
Heckscher, C. (2001) 'Response to Adler, "Market, Hierarchy, and Trust"', Organization 
Science 12: 235-7. 
Hudson, B.A. and Wong-MingJi, D.J. (2001) 'Legitimacy and Illegitimacy: A Contest of 
Institutional Knowledge as Power', Organization 8: 396-402. 
Ireland, R.D. and Webb, J.W. (2007) 'A multi-theoretic perspective on trust and power in 
strategic supply chains', Journal of Operations Management 25: 482-97. 
Janowicz, M. and Noorderhaven, N. (2006) 'Levels of inter-organizational trust: 
Conceptualization and measurement', in R. Bachmann and A. Zaheer (eds), Handbook of 
Trust Research, pp. 264-79. Cheltenham: Elgar. 
Jeffries, F.L. and Reed, R. (2000) 'Trust and Adaptation in Relational Contracting', Academy 
of Management Review 25: 873-82. 
Jex, S. (1998) Stress and Job Performance: Theory, Research, and Implications for 
Managerial Practice. Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
Kahn, R.L., Wolfe, D.M., Quinn, R.P. and Snoek, J.D. (1964) Organizational Stress: Studies 
in Role Conflict and Ambiguity. New York: Wiley. 
Knights, D. and Morgan, G. (1994) 'Organization theory, consumption and the service sector', 
in J. Hassard and M. Parker (eds) Towards a New Theory of Organizations, pp. 131-52. 
London: Routledge. 
Knights, D., Murray, F. and Willmott, H. (1993) 'Networking as Knowledge Work: A Study 
of Strategic Interorganizational Development in the Financial Services Industry', Joumal 
of Management Studies 30: 975-95. 
Knights, D., Noble, F., Vurdubakis, T. and Willmott, H. (2001) 'Chasing Shadows: Control, 
Virtuality and the Production of Trust', Organization Studies 22: 311-36. 
Knights, D. and Vurdubakis, A. (1994) 'Foucault, Power, Resistance and All That', in J.M. 
Jermier, D. Knights and W.R. Nord (eds) Resistance and Power in Organizations, pp. 
167-98. London: Routledge. 
Knights, D. and Willmott, H. (1989) 'Power and Subjectivity at Work: From Degradation to 
Subjugation in Social Relations', Sociology 23: 535-58. 
Kramer, R.M. (1996) 'Divergent Realities and Convergent Disappointments in the Hierarchic 
Relation: Trust and the Intuitive Auditor at Work', in R.M. Kramer and T.R. Tyler (eds), 
Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, pp. 216-45. London: SAGE. 
Kern, H. (2000) 'Lack of Trust, Surfeit of Trust: Some Causes of the Innovation Crisis in 
German Industry', in C. Lane and R. Bachmann (eds.), Trust Within and Between 
Organizations: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Applications, pp. 203-13. Oxford: OUP. 
Lahno, B. (2001) 'Institutional Trust: A Less Demanding Form of Trust?', Revista 
Latinoamericana de Estudios Avanzados 15: 19-58. 
Lamnek, S. (1989) Qualitative Sozialforschung, Vol. 2. Weinheim: Psychologie Verlags 
Union. 
Lane, C. and Bachmann, R. (1996) 'The Social Constitution of Trust: Supplier Relations in 
Britain and Germany', Organization Studies 17: 365-95. 
Lane, C. and Bachmann, R. (1997) 'Co-operation in inter-firm relations in Britain and 
Germany: the role of social institutions', British Journal of Sociology 48: 226-54. 
Lepsius, R.M. (1997) 'Vertrauen zu Institutionen', in S. Hradil (ed.), Differenz und 
Integration: Die Zukunft moderner Gesellschaften, pp. 283-93. Frankfurt: Campus. 
Lewicki, R.J., McAllister, D.J. and Bies, R.J. (1998) 'Trust and Distrust: New Relationships 
and Realities', Academy of Management Review 23: 438-58. 
Lewis, J.D. and Weigert, A. (1985) 'Trust as a Social Reality', Social Forces 63: 967-85. 
Lorenz, E.H. (1988) 'Neither Friends nor Strangers: Informal Networks of Subcontracting in 
French Industry', in D. Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relations, pp. 194-210. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Louis, M.R. (1980) 'Surprise and sense making: what newcomers experience in entering 
unfamiliar organizational settings', Administrative Science Quarterly 25: 226-251. 
Luhmann, N. (1979) Trust and Power. Chichester: Wiley. 
Luhmann, N. (1988) 'Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives', in D. 
Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, pp. 94-107. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Lukes, S. (1974) Power: A Radical View. London: Macmillan. 
Luxon, N. (2004) 'Truthfulness, Risk, and Trust in the Late Lectures of Michel Foucault', 
Inquiry 47: 464-89. 
Mahoney, J. (2000) 'Path dependence in historical sociology', Theory and Society 29: 507-48. 
Mayer, R.C., Davis, J.H. and Schoorman, D.F. (1995) 'An Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust', Academy of Management Review 20: 709-34. 
McCabe, D. (2010) 'Strategy-as-Power: Ambiguity, Contradiction and the Exercise of Power 
in a UK Building Society', Organization 17: 151-75. 
Mills, P.K. and Ungson, G.R. (2003) 'Reassessing the Limits of Structural Empowerment: 
Organizational Constitution and Trust as Controls', Academy of Management Review 28: 
143-53. 
Misztal, B.A. (2001) 'Normality and Trust in Goffman's Conception of Interaction Order', 
Sociological Theory 19: 312-24. 
Mizrachi, N., Dori, I. and Anspach, R.R. (2007) 'Repertoires of Trust: The Practice of Trust in 
a Multinational Organization amid Political Conflict', American Sociological Review 72: 
143-65. 
Möllering, G. (2001) 'The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, 
Interpretation and Suspension', Sociology 35: 403-20. 
Möllering, G. (2006a) 'Trust, Institutions, Agency: Towards a Neoinstitutional Theory of 
Trust', in R. Bachmann and A. Zaheer (eds), Handbook of Trust Research, pp. 355-376. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Möllering, G. (2006b) Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Molm, L.D. (1997) 'Risk and Power Use: Constraints on the Use of Coercion in Exchange', 
American Sociological Review 62: 113-33. 
Morgan, R.M. and Hunt, S.D. (1994) 'The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship 
Marketing', Journal of Marketing 58: 20-38. 
Morgner, C. (2008) 'The Distinction between Personal and System Trust', discussion paper, 
Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge. 
Nonis, S.A., Sager, J.K. and Kumar, K. (1996) 'Salespeople's Use of Upward Influence 
Tactics in Coping With Role Stress', Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 24: 
44-56. 
Organ, D.W. (1971) 'Linking Pins between Organization and Environment', Business 
Horizons 14: 73-80. 
Organ, D.W. (1988) 'A Restatement of the Satisfaction-Performance Hypothesis', Journal of 
Management 14: 547-57. 
Perrone, V., Zaheer, A. and McEvily, B. (2003) 'Free to Be Trusted? Organizational 
Constraints on Trust in Boundary Spanners', Organization Science 14: 422-39. 
Pierson, P. (2000) 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics', American 
Political Science Review 94: 251-67. 
Rao, A. and Schmidt, S.M. (1998) 'A Behavioral Perspective on Negotiating International 
Alliances', Journal of International Business Studies 29: 665-93. 
Reed, M.I. (2001) 'Organization, Trust and Control: A Realist Analysis', Organization Studies 
22: 201-28. 
Ring, P.S. and Van de Ven, A.H. (1994) 'Developmental Processes of Cooperative 
Interorganizational Relationships', Academy of Management Review 19: 90-118. 
Rotter, J.B. (1971) 'Generalized expectancies for interpersonal trust', American Psychologist 
26: 443-452. 
Rousseau, D.M. (1985) 'Issues of level in organizational research', Research in 
Organizational Behavior 7: 1-37. 
Rousseau, D.M. and House, R.J. (1994) 'Meso Organizational Behavior: Avoiding Three 
Fundamental Biases', Trends in Organizational Behavior 1: 13-30. 
Samra-Fredericks, D. (2005) 'Strategic Practice, 'Discourse' and the Everyday Interactional 
Constitution of 'Power Effects' ', Organization 12: 803-41. 
Sarantakos, S. (1993) Social Research. Houndsmill: Macmillan. 
Schiffrin, A. (2001) The Business of Books. London: Verso. 
Schutz, A. (1962) 'On multiple realities', in Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social 
Reality, pp. 207-59. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Schweer, M.K.W. (2003) 'Vertrauen als Organizationsprinzip: Vertrauensfoerderung im 
Spannungsfeld personalen und systemischen Vertrauens', Erwägen Wissen Ethik 14: 323-
32. 
Scott, W.R. (2008) Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests. London: Sage. 
Sewell, W.H. (1992) 'A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation', American 
Journal of Sociology 98: 1-29. 
Shapiro, S. (1987) 'The Social Control of Impersonal Trust', American Journal of Sociology 
93: 623-58. 
Six, F. and Sorge, A. (2008) 'Creating a High-Trust Organization: An Exploration into 
Organizational Policies that Stimulate Interpersonal Trust Building', Journal of 
Management Studies 45: 857-84. 
Smart, B. (1983) Foucault, Marxism and Critique. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Stinchcombe, A.L. (1968) Constructing Social Theories. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Swidler, A. (1986) 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies', American Sociological 
Review 51: 273-86. 
Sydow, J. (2006) 'How can systems trust systems? A structuration perspective on trust-
building in inter-organizational relations' In R. Bachmann and A. Zaheer (eds), 
Handbook of Trust Research, pp. 377-96. Cheltenham: Elgar. 
Sydow, J., Windeler, A. and Möllering, G. (2004) 'Path-Creating Networks in the Field of 
Text Generation Lithography: Outline of a Research Project', working paper, Technische 
Universität Berlin. 
Uslaner, E.M. (2002) The Moral Foundations of Trust. Cambridge: CUP. 
Walker, O.C., Churchill, G.A. and Ford, N.M. (1975) 'Organizational Determinants of the 
Industrial Salesman's Role Conflict and Ambiguity', Journal of Marketing 39: 32-9. 
Weick, K.E. (1985) 'The Significance of Corporate Culture', in P.J. Frost et al. (eds), 
Organizational Culture, pp. 381-9. London: SAGE. 
Whetten, D.A. (1978) 'Coping with Incompatible Expectations: An Integrated View of Role 
Conflict', Administrative Science Quarterly 23: 254-71. 
Williams, P. (2002) 'The Competent Boundary Spanner', Public Administration 80: 103-24. 
Zaheer, A. and Harris, J. (2006) 'Interorganizational Trust', in Shenkar, O. and Reuer, J. (eds) 
Handbook of Strategic Alliances, pp. 169-98. London: Sage. 
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B. and Perrone, V. (1998) 'Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of 
Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance', Organization Science 9: 
141-59. 
Zucker, L.G. (1986) 'Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840-
1920', Research in Organizational Behavior 8: 53-111. 
Zucker, L.G. (1991) 'The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence', in W.W. Powell 
and P.J. DiMaggio (eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, pp. 83-
107. Chicago: UCP. 
 
 
Biography 
 
Frens Kroeger is Lecturer in Organisation Studies and Deputy Director of the newly 
established Centre for Trust Research, University of Surrey. Prior to this, he completed his 
PhD at the Department of Sociology and Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge. 
His research interests revolve around the issue of trust within and between organisations, 
which he approaches from a strongly conceptual, sociologically informed, and broadly 
neoinstitutionalist perspective. Address: Surrey Business School, University of Surrey, 
Guildford GU2 7XH, UK. Email: f.kroeger@surrey.ac.uk 
Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
